Is India ‘indispensable partner’ of US?

Mahmood Riazuddin

US President barack Obama’s visit to India coincides with four important developments: i) The third round of Pakistan-US strategic dialogue has just concluded; ii) Obama’s Democratic Party has faced a humiliating blow in the mid-term elections in United States; iii) India has launched an aggressive campaign to have permanent membership of the UN Security Council; and iv) Kashmiris are observing Jammu Martyrs Day [November 6] which is reminiscent of en bloc massacre of Kashmiris in 1947. Obama’s decision to prefer India for his visit to the region speaks volumes for the sort of relations between the sole superpower of the world and the mini-superpower in the region. This is despite the fact that Pakistan has been playing the role of a frontline state in the US-led war on terror for the last nine long years and it has suffered colossal losses in terms of men and material during this course, and is still facing the consequences of its being a non-NATO ally of the United States. However, the Americans ignoring this role have waged an undeclared war against Pakistan and the bane of US drone strikes have posed a grave challenge to the very sovereignty of the country. Some Pakistanis are of the view that enhancement of US-India relations is just a misgiving, but they must acknowledge that the two countries share many commonalities and the common objectives besides the ‘common enemy’ that is China. The chronologies of India and United States reveal that both of them have expansionist and hegemonic designs and they have frequently indulged in adventurisms not only against their neighboring states but also the countries in other regions to fulfill their designs. United States is the sole power which has so far used a nuclear weapon while India is the sole country which conducted a nuclear test in South Asia thereby igniting a nuclear race in the region. In the recent years, United States has executed a so-called civil nuclear cooperation accord with India but at the same time, it has frequently refused such an arrangement with Pakistan. Similarly, both the countries have constantly been stockpiling sophisticated weapons. They have conducted 50 joint military exercises during the last few years while India is going to purchase military [war] equipment worth $2.5 billion. President Obama has regarded India ‘an indispensable partner’ of his country while India takes United States as its natural ally. However, United States desires to see India not its indispensable partner, but an invincible partner against the emerging superpower China and the basic objective of Obama’s visit to India is to control the growing might of China. United States does not like any country to try to become a superpower and as regards China, it has proved itself a peace-loving country during its post-independence history. The United States claims that China’s attitude is becoming ‘nationalist’ and its leadership shows unexpected assertiveness which reveals their ‘arrogance and belligerence’. That is why, United States has adopted a more forceful attitude towards China and has been encouraging India, Vietnam and other countries in South East Asia. As stated President Obama considers India an indispensable partner of his country, but at the same time, he appreciates the indispensability of a Pakistani role in a settlement in Afghanistan. However, in practical terms, he seems to be in no mood for a settlement nor is he ready to assign such a role to Pakistan, a fact which is evident from additional US deployments in the war-torn country. Similarly, Obama is also in no mood to address India’s growing presence in Afghanistan. Rather he welcomes its involvement in the economy of the war-ravaged country. In his electoral campaign, Barack [then Hussain] Obama had talked of peace and stability in different regions of the world particularly in the Middle East and South Asia. He had also promised to facilitate an amicable solution to the lingering Kashmir issue which he had realized to be a bone of contention between Pakistan and India. It is high time that Obama involves himself in the resolution of differences particularly the core Kashmir issue between the nuclear armed rivals. It is crystal clear that during talks, the Indian leadership will approach President Obama for help to promote Delhi’s bid to become a permanent UN Security Council member even without veto power. But it will be advisable that President Obama links the issue to India’s worst record of human rights abuses in Occupied Kashmir. The fact remains that India has waged a genocidal war against the Kashmiris and has martyred in just four months over 150 defenseless inhabitants of the territory it has been illegally occupying for the last 63 years. It is pertinent to mention here that since October 1989, the 700,000 strong Indian forces have martyred 100,000 Kashmiris – many more scarred and wounded, to silence the people’s demand for justice, respect for human rights, freedom and the right of self-determination. The occupation troops continue to carry out arbitrary detentions, summary executions, custodial killings, extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, rapes, sexual exploitation, torture and fake encounters. Generations of Kashmiris have grown up under the shadow of the gun; not a single family is unaffected; and the suffering and devastation continues unabated that has inflicted loss of life and destruction on an unprecedented scale, drawing no significant attention from the international community particularly the United States. The perception that the Kashmir is a bilateral matter between Pakistan and India is unfounded because since the adoption of the UN resolutions in 1948, Kashmir is no longer a bilateral or territorial dispute between the two countries but has become an international obligation. The prospect of peace and progress in South Asia is inseparably linked with the recognition of the right of self-determination of the Kashmiris, and thus rests upon the willingness of the world community particularly the United States to make positive contribution towards resolving the Kashmir conflict. The high scale of brutalities in the held territory suggests that India is poised to avoid implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. If President Obama wants to see his name written in the history in golden letters or as a global leader, he should not only raise the Kashmir issue during his visit to India but should also facilitate its resolution through a plebiscite in accordance with the UN resolutions, and urge India to respect the UN resolutions on Kashmir to become a permanent member of the world body. Obama’s failure to do so will further weaken credibility and standing of the United States.

Obama’s visit: Indian economy

Asif Haroon Raja

After the end of Cold War while Pakistan-US relations soured, Indo-US relations warmed up. The foundation of Indo-US strategic relations laid in 1990 prospered throughout the 1990s despite certain irritants such as nuclear non-proliferation, Russian origin missile technology and human rights violations. Huge investments were made to boost sagging economy of India . Software industry and agriculture sector in particular was given greater attention thereby enabling Indian economy to shrug off its sluggishness and become vibrant. Indo-US conjugation climaxed when Bill Clinton accompanied by extraordinarily large contingent of over 2000 businessmen and others visited India from 21-25 March 2000 and their relationship blossomed into solid strategic partnership. Besides removing sanctions imposed in the wake of India ’s nuclear explosions in May 1998, and turning a blind eye to the existing irritants, India was cajoled, pampered and showered with heavy investments worth billions of dollars. An atmosphere of festivity and rejoicing pervaded the Indian horizon throughout the period of visitors stay. In contrast to high profile visit to India , Clinton ’s five-hour visit to Islamabad was a non-event. Ouster of democratic regime of Nawaz Sharif by Gen Musharraf had not gone down well in Washington . Accompanied by his personal staff and contingent of security goons, his attitude throughout his brief stay was curt and officious. He preferred to meet President Rafiq Tarar and completely ignored Musharraf. He came with an empty bag and had nothing to offer to Pakistan except to lecture Pakistani nation. What he conveyed was that Pakistan should agree to return to civilian rule, rollback nuclear program, eliminate terrorism, accept Line of Control as permanent border in Kashmir , rein in fundamentalist elements and accept India as a regional power. He added that unless Pakistan agreed to these proposals, it would not qualify itself for the restoration of US economic and technical assistance that had been severed in October 1990. He cautioned that failing to fulfill the stated pre-conditions, not only 1990 and 1998 sanctions would remain operative, other financial institutions and world bodies would be asked to tighten the economic screws on Pakistan . In other words, Pakistan would be declared a pariah and a failed state. Needless for me to recount how George Bush led Republicans after coming to power twisted the arm of Musharraf suffering from legitimacy bug and made him agree to promote US interests in the region at the cost of national interests. Bush era promoted India as a counterweight to China . It helped India in consolidating its influence in Afghanistan . We also distinctly recall Bush’s visit to India in March 2006. Other than tens of defence and economic agreements worth billions of dollars, biggest trophy awarded was the lucrative civil nuclear deal. After this hi-fi visit, expectations in Pakistan were sky high. Reasons for such optimism were that Pakistan had acted as the frontline state and was playing a key role in US war on terror, had arrested and handed over more than 700 Al-Qaeda operatives to USA, and Musharraf had become the blue-eyed boy of Bush. High hopes crashed when Bush said that he had come on an inspection tour to check progress of Pakistan on ground. Not only request for a nuclear deal similar to India was brusquely turned down, no worthwhile defence or economic agreement was inked. Even direly needed counter terrorism equipment was denied due to Indian fears. Concerns of Pakistan about covert operations by RAW from Afghan soil were also not heeded to since he had approvingly listened to complaints made against Pakistan by Karzai at Kabul . Bush sympathized with perpetrators of cross border terrorism against Pakistan but he turned a deaf ear to Pakistan ’s pleadings that it was victim of cross border terrorism. It was understandable for Bush to pretend deafness since he knew that CIA was the chief coordinator of covert operations launched against Pakistan from Afghan soil. After Bush’s tour of this region, US attitude against Pakistan stiffened and became more and more aggressive. In his last year in power, Pak-US relations had dipped low because of unsubstantiated accusations made against Pakistan and Washington’s dissatisfaction over performance of Pak Army in war on terror. Mumbai attacks on 26/11 not only strained Indo-Pak relations but also had an adverse impact on Pak-US relations. Barack Obama from whom better response was expected did not prove any better from his predecessor. Rather, he shifted the weight of war on terror entirely towards Afghanistan and Pakistan thorough his ill-conceived Af-Pak policy. He brought no change in US tilt towards India and continued to prepare it as a bulwark against China and to make it a key player in Afghan affairs. Pakistan bashing continued unabated and drone strikes were accelerated. Propaganda against Pakistan ’s nuclear program and its alleged linkage with Taliban and Al-Qaeda became malicious. He also ignored Pakistan ’s request for award of US nuclear technology on the plea that it had not proven itself to be a responsible state. Attitude of Obama and his administration towards Pakistan became less vituperative at the dawn of 2010 because of brilliant performance of Pak Army in Malakand, Swat and South Waziristan and also due to worsening security situation in Afghanistan . The US wanted Pakistan to help in dividing the Taliban and isolating the hardliners led by Mullah Omar since neither Karzai regime, or India , or CIA, or Saudi Arabia could do so. A need for a political solution to Afghan imbroglio was direly felt since this was the only plausible way to ensure an honorable exit. Kerry Lugar Bill followed by strategic dialogue was aimed at bridging the trust deficit and creating better understanding between the two countries. Confidence building measures and carrots in no way match the endowments doled out to India , which is being continuously rewarded despite having done nothing in fighting war on terror. It neither sent any military contingent in Iraq nor in Afghanistan . Despite this glaring dichotomy, India is presented the cake and leftover crumbs are given to Pakistan which has given sacrifices more than any other country. After Clinton and Bush, it is now Obama’s turn to visit India for three days from 6-8 November in order to further cement Indo-US strategic ties. Principally speaking Obama should have visited Afghanistan and Pakistan where war is raging and not India which is covertly fuelling flames of war. Since economics override politics and strategic considerations, India has been preferred. Other reason for not including Pakistan in his itinerary was the heightened bitterness between two archrivals, both carrying host of grouses against each other. Obama was faced with a dilemma since on one hand India is indispensable to US, on the other Pakistan ’s significance in context with endgame of Afghanistan could not be overlooked. Obama was not in a position to offer goodies in equal proportion to both or to play one against the other. He also knew that presently anti-Americanism in Pakistan is on the peak and his own popularity is down because of high spate of drone strikes in Waziristan . Explosive situation in occupied Kashmir due to massive unarmed uprising and gross human rights violations by Indian security forces was another pressure point which he wanted to avoid. These considerations constrained Obama to take off Pakistan from his itinerary, but he hastened to compensate it by pledging to make an exclusive trip to Pakistan next year. Obama can ill-afford at this critical juncture to please India at the cost of Pakistan. Unlike his two predecessors who were in a stronger position, he will be cautious and will take extra care not to offend the sensibilities of Pakistan and risk losing its critical support. Obama’s visit to India will be outweighed by economic considerations. It will be more of a business oriented tour to promote US exports and less of politics. —The writer is a defence, political analyst.

India in Afghanistan — I

The writer is an assistant professor at Georgetown University and author of Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States (The Lyons Press, August 2003) christine.fair@tribune.com.pk

India’s profile in Afghanistan has been a looming concern for New Delhi, Washington, Brussels and, of course, Islamabad with all wondering what the optimal role for India in Afghanistan’s reconstruction is, in light of the security competition between India and Pakistan. Some want to expand India’s presence in Afghanistan through Indian training of Afghan civilian and military personnel, development projects and economic ties. Others caution against such involvement. Others yet see Indian and Pakistani competition in Afghanistan as a new “Great Game” and argue that Afghanistan can be pacified through a regional solution that settles the Kashmir dispute.
India’s interests in Afghanistan are not only Pakistan-specific but also tied to India’s desire to be seen as an extra-regional power moving toward great power status. While India’s presence in Afghanistan has Pakistan-specific utility, India’s interests in Afghanistan can be seen as merely one element within India’s desire to be able to project its interests well beyond South Asia.
India has three principal aims in Afghanistan. First, it faced security threats from the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the 1990s which provided training opportunities and safe havens for several Pakistani groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, which operate in India. India insists that Afghanistan should not again become a terrorist safe haven.
Second, India wants to retain Afghanistan as a friendly state from which it can monitor Pakistan and, where possible, cultivate assets to influence activities in Pakistan. Naturally, Pakistan seeks to deny India such opportunities.
Third, developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan have a negative effect on India’s domestic social fabric. Hindu nationalists and their militant counterparts live in a violent symbiosis with Islamist militant groups operating in and around India. Islamist terrorism in the region provides grist for the mill of Hindu nationalism and its violent offshoots.
Contrary to some Pakistani views, India’s ties to Afghanistan are not new. In 1950, Afghanistan and India signed a “Friendship Treaty.” Prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, New Delhi formalised agreements with various pro-Soviet regimes in Kabul. During the anti-Soviet jihad, India expanded its development activities in Afghanistan.
After the Taliban consolidated their hold on Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, India struggled to maintain its presence. It aimed to undermine the Taliban by supporting the Northern Alliance in tandem with other regional actors.
Working with Iran, Russia and Tajikistan, India provided important resources to the Northern Alliance, the only meaningful challenge to the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to journalist Rahul Bedi, India also ran a 25-bed hospital at Farkhor (Ayni), Tajikistan, for more than a year and supplied the Northern Alliance with high altitude warfare equipment worth around $8 million. India also based several ‘defence advisers’ in Tajikistan to advise the Northern Alliance in their operations against the Taliban.
Since 2001, India has relied upon development projects and other forms of humanitarian assistance. To facilitate these projects and to collect intelligence (as all embassies do), India now has consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, in addition to its embassy in Kabul. There are also a number of smaller-scale activities throughout Afghanistan. According to the US, British, and Afghan officials that I interviewed over the last several years, India’s activities are not isolated to the north, where it has had traditional ties, but also include efforts in the southern provinces and in the northeast, abutting the Pakistani border.
This is a condensed version of an article that was first appeared on Foreign Policy’s Af-Pak Channel on October 26, 2010
Published in The Express Tribune, October 31^st, 2010.

Revisiting Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Depth’

Syed Nadir El Edroos 1 month ago

We need to engage with both Afghanistan and India to leverage our geographic position to develop strategic depth with positive connotations.

Two words that hold our country hostage is our policy of maintaining ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan. Apart from referring to a poorly titled adult film, the policy envisages to protect Pakistan’s eastern borders from unwanted Indian influence.
However, the consequences of continuing with this policy and differentiating between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ Taliban, has led to accusations of Pakistan playing a ‘double-game’ in Afghanistan. For many the accusation has become quite stale and repetitive. It seems to have become an open secret, with many accepting it as a reality, a part of the status-quo for dealing with the troubles in the region.
Whether the policy has been successful is debatable. The military’s and the ISI’s continued links with the Haqqani network ensures that they are a sought after broker for any back channel attempt to woo the Taliban.
The strategy aims to maintain Pakistani influence in/over Afghanistan, and to thwart alleged Indian designs. However, the policy has at the same time made Pakistan quite unpopular with large segments of the Afghan establishment. Interfering in Afghanistan’s affairs, while demanding an end to foreign influence in Pakistan is met with much ridicule in foreign capitals; it reeks of hypocrisy.
The policy is also questionable, as it breeds violence, and is responsible for the deaths of thousands in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As the violence continues, Pakistan is sure to be in the news, accused for fostering, abating or at the very least tolerating continued bloodshed to maintain its interests.
The result is the ‘image deficit’ that haunts Pakistan. The dismal public response to the floods in Pakistan for example was attributed to this effect. It has also been more difficult for our economic managers to garner favourable trade concessions and development grants. Winning over wider public support remains a problem, as Pakistan remains associated with fostering rather than curtailing violence in Afghanistan. Politicians in the west are portrayed as weak by the right-wing media, such as Fox News in the US, for taking initiatives to support Pakistan.
Look at any article posted on any western news outlet. The comments question the calls for sympathy for Pakistan as we are branded as supporters of terrorism, who inflict material and physical damage on their interests.
An alternative strategy
There needs to be an alternative to our current strategy. The alternative need not be between defending Pakistan from India or bowing before it and allowing it a free hand in Afghanistan. We need to engage with both Afghanistan and India to leverage our geographic position to develop strategic depth with positive connotations.
The US, Afghanistan and India have been pressing Pakistan to allow the transit of Indian goods over Pakistan through to Afghanistan and vice versa for years. I say, let the goods pass, hell put them on the trains. That will help to give our faltering railways a financial shot in the arm. Extend the Iran-Pakistan pipeline into India, let the gas flow. Transit fees galore! Rather than questioning Indian development aid to Afghanistan we should support it. Geographically it’s more of an advantage for us, as any increase in economic activity in Afghanistan will immediately suck in Pakistani exports.
What would the advantages be? Imagine the headlines. Pakistan would look like the peace builder, shunning international criticism and situating itself as committed to the development of an Afghan state. We would also be seen on the diplomatic offensive vis-à-vis India. With Pakistan offering so many incentives, India will have to respond in the affirmative. After all India is cultivating its image as a regional and global superpower, the ball will firmly be in India’s court. It cannot be seen rebuffing genuine gestures from its old foe.
Importantly, a policy that leverages our geographic position economically rather than militarily negates any association with violence.  We would be treated as victims rather than the guilty.
If India is indeed developing consulates across Afghanistan housing RAW agents that ferment trouble in Pakistan, improved economic ties will help shed a spotlight on the functioning of these consulates. As Pakistan becomes vital for transporting Indian-Afghanistan exports and imports to each other, minimising any threat to these links will become a primary concern for Indian traders. This will build added pressure on those who dare concoct nefarious designs to fuel militancy in Balochistan for example.
India can switch on and off the belligerent rhetoric as India’s economy has little or no interests in Pakistan. However, a Pakistan which is vital for Indian trade, supply of resources etc will have no choice but to tone down any sabre rattling that seems to be a cyclical part of Pakistan-India relations.
So where does Pakistan’s security come in?
In any period of belligerent hostility Pakistan will have the ability to cut of energy and trade links. Containers can be seized, Indian traders in Pakistan arrested, and diplomatically we can garner support by portraying ourselves of peace. We have gone the extra mile to foster our relations with India and support a viable Afghanistan. India would be seen as the aggressor. How is that for maintaining strategic depth?
Our present policy allows for India’s security establishment to deal with her interests in Afghanistan ignoring any media or public scrutiny. A policy that places economic links at its foundations will open up Indian policy on Pakistan and Afghanistan and the actions of its security agencies to wider scrutiny. The competition between competing interests will insure that whatever policy is actually implemented is a watered down compromise that is not a real threat to Pakistan.
We have to find alternatives to the status-quo. With the nation reeling under flooding, terrorism and economic stagnation we are more dependent on foreign assistance than at any point in our history. They are not many variables that we can control for. We can’t control how the foreign press paints us, how we are perceived abroad etc. However, what little we can do to help alter these perceptions, we must. And this does not have to lead to subjugation to Indian influence that many right wing commentators would suggest.
If we are to continue with our obsession with thwarting Indian designs, can we please do it in a manner that doesn’t hold us all hostage to violence and paint us as terrorist?
Shaping global opinion is a long term effort which must start sooner than later. Our challenges for the future, access to water, natural disasters caused by climate change and development depends in a large part to interaction and support of our neighbours and the international community. Politics and security needs are always a concern, but we must get society at large, the world over on our sign. We are not the cause but the victims. Strategic depth? Sure, but by other means.