Kyrgyzstan's toppled government

Tear gas, not tulips

Apr 8th 2010 | BISHKEK
From The Economist print edition

An uprising in Kyrgyzstan watched throughout Central Asia and beyond

FIVE years after the “Tulip revolution” which led to the ouster of one president, Kyrgyzstan has seen another flee the capital, another new government set up and more elections promised. How stable the new regime will be, however, is far from clear.

Violent clashes between thousands of anti-government demonstrators and police in the capital, Bishkek, on Wednesday April 7th left at least 65 people dead and about 500 injured. The police used tear gas, smoke grenades and live bullets to dispel rioters in front of the presidential palace in the city centre—to no avail. The crowds stormed the government building and set fire to the prosecutor’s office.

In the afternoon, the president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, imposed a curfew on Bishkek and three regions in the north and centre of the country. By the evening, though, he had left the capital in an aeroplane and was rumoured to have landed in Osh, his stronghold in the volatile Ferghana valley. His appearance there could raise the spectre of north-south divisions and the continuation of violence.

As the president was fleeing, leaders of the Opposition were negotiating with members of his administration about a transfer of power. After the prime minister, Daniyar Usenov, resigned, his post was taken by Roza Otunbayeva, who will lead an interim government for six months until elections take place. Ms Otunbayeva was a prominent opposition figure during the 2005 revolution and became foreign minister. But, disenchanted with Mr Bakiyev, she later joined the new opposition.

The revolution has thus devoured its children. Yet the uprising itself did not come as a surprise, only perhaps its speed and its bloodiness. Discontent had been simmering since the beginning of the year, after a steep increase in energy prices.

That was painful in itself and made the nepotism of President Bakiyev and the increasing scale of corruption by senior officials—worse than under the previous leadership—much harder to bear. The uprising in Bishkek was triggered by events the day before in the city of Talas, in the north of the country, where unrest has been concentrated (President Bakiyev is from the south and southerners dominated his administration). Several thousand demonstrators stormed the regional government building and took the governor hostage. He was freed by the police, but the demonstrators later retook the building. The protest then swept through the country, reaching Bishkek the next day.

Mr Bakiyev made two decisive mistakes. First, he had almost all the country’s opposition leaders arrested by the morning of April 7th, which left the protesting crowds without any sense of direction or moderating influence. The leaders were almost all released later in the day but by then it was too late. Second, he miscalculated by using brutal force to hang on to power, which ultimately made it impossible for him to stay. The police were also clearly outnumbered by protesters.

Mr Bakiyev disappointed many of his supporters by not living up to his promises of democracy and political reform. He failed to curb corruption, mismanaged the economy, placed some of his numerous relatives in important positions and overall, became more authoritarian than the predecessor he helped to oust.

On the eve of the fifth anniversary of the Tulip revolution, on March 23rd, he declared that Western-style democracy, a system based on elections and individual human rights, might not be suitable for Kyrgyzstan (which once styled itself Central Asia’s Switzerland, a tolerant, mountainous place). He thought “consultative democracy”—ie, talking to local bigwigs—would be more in line with the country’s traditions.

The events in Kyrgyzstan have implications for Russia and America, which both have military bases in the impoverished country. The Americans, who supply troops in Afghanistan from Manas base in the north of the country, just managed to retain rights to it last year. This upset the Russians, who had offered the Kyrgyz $2 billion in aid, presumably hoping Manas would be closed. The Kremlin’s leaders do not seem to have offered Mr Bakiyev asylum in Moscow, as they did to his predecessor. On April 8th, the new prime minister said America can continue to use the Manas airbase.

But the abrupt change in Kyrgyzstan is also being closely watched in the rest of Central Asia. This was the second time that as few as 5,000 demonstrators succeeded in overthrowing an unwanted government in Kyrgyzstan—an example that the no-less authoritarian neighbours fear could be emulated elsewhere. For the Kyrgyz people, though, it is an opportunity to get things right the second time around.

NEW ARMS DEAL

America’s nuclear posture

Logic v politics

Apr 8th 2010
From The Economist print edition

Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev sign a new strategic arms-reduction treaty in Prague

HE HAD stopped over briefly in Prague for a handshake with Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, on a new strategic arms-reduction treaty—and a new start also, it is hoped, in relations with America’s still prickly cold-war rival. And then Barack Obama was due back in Washington to play host to more than 40 heads of government for his own nuclear-security summit on April 12th and 13th. Mr Obama wants pledges from them to secure nuclear materials around the world and to crack down harder on illicit traffickers, ahead of next month’s five-yearly review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the world’s main bulwark against proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

Yet when it comes to recasting America’s own nuclear-weapons policy to deal more efficiently with the same threats, Mr Obama may have a battle ahead. In many ways, this week’s delayed nuclear posture review simply brings America’s official nuclear thinking into line with long-standing practice, including that of his more warlike predecessor, George Bush. With the demise of the old Soviet threat, nuclear weapons play a diminishing role in America’s defences. Like Mr Bush, Mr Obama plans instead to rely more on America’s array of powerful conventional weapons to deter future adversaries in a crisis.

But Mr Obama has followed this logic several steps further. He did not, as some inside and outside his administration wanted, declare that America would never be the first to use its nuclear weapons. That would have unsettled allies in exposed places who still rely for their safety on America’s nuclear umbrella.

Instead the review repeats a past pledge that America will not use nuclear weapons against states that do not have them and are in compliance, Mr Obama says, with their commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That leaves Iran, Syria and others suspected of illicit nuclear dabbling still theoretically on the potential target list. Yet Mr Obama has also ruled out, as Mr Bush never did, nuclear retaliation against chemical, biological or cyber attacks by the nuclear have-nots—unless, that is, America’s fundamental security or that of its allies is at risk.

He agrees with Mr Bush that America can make deep cuts in the weapons stocks it keeps in reserve to hedge against technical failure or a surprise new threat. Mr Bush would have done this while building fewer, but more modern, replacement nuclear warheads. Mr Obama prefers instead to refurbish some existing ones. He also plans to upgrade further America’s nuclear-weapons labs and other facilities. The vice-president, Joseph Biden, has called the labs “national treasures”. Mr Obama’s budget includes $624m beyond the sum Congress earmarked last year for such work, with more to come over five years.

But already there are grumbles. The extra cash has not stopped the labs’ directors asking for more. Mr Obama needs their support. For he intends to do something Mr Bush refused to do: to work to win Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was rejected on a partisan vote in 1999.

The leader of the attack last time was Arizona’s Jon Kyl, still a Republican senator. Mr Kyl insists, as he did then, that a CTBT is unverifiable—and, by banning future testing, puts America’s nuclear safety and security at risk. In fact, America has not felt any need to test its bombs since 1992. Advances in high-speed computing and other technologies allow today’s labs to solve problems that actual weapons tests never could. Meanwhile, the treaty’s global monitoring system is now a reality. Unlike other enemies, however, Mr Kyl is undeterred.

The potential overthrow of Kyrgyzstan's government

Despotism Doesn’t Equal Stability

The potential overthrow of Kyrgyzstan's government is worrisome for not only its neighbors but also the United States and its operations in Afghanistan.

By Owen Matthews | Newsweek Web Exclusive

Apr 7, 2010

The day of snowballing riots and violence that culminated in President Kurmanbek Bakiyev's fleeing his capital Wednesday evening is the worst nightmare of every despot in Central Asia and beyond. A government that thought it had secured itself against opposition by increasingly brutal police methods suddenly found a people rising in anger, besieging ministries, beating up the interior minister and finally forcing the president to scuttle to a private jet.

It was a grim mirror image of 2005's Tulip Revolution that brought Bakiyev to power when a broad coalition of antigovernment forces ousted former president Askar Akayev, and with similar swiftness. International commentators back then were quick to lump Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution along with the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Indeed the popular anger at old, corrupt Communist elites was similar in all cases. But in truth the Kyrgyz "color revolution" brought to power not pro-Western democrats but a group of former apparatchiks who quickly became as hated as the ousted Akayev regime.

The Bakiyev family "ran the country like a criminal syndicate," says Professor Alexander Cooley of Columbia University. Worst of all, for the people of Kyrgyzstan and the region, Bakiyev and his allies soon began cracking down on opposition activism, on international observers such as the International Crisis Group, and on the U.S. presence in his country by threatening to expel American troops from the Manas airbase, a key staging post for NATO operations in Afghanistan.

But the swift collapse of the government isn't just a nightmare for the nervous rulers of the region; it's a serious cause for concern for both Central Asia's big neighbors, Russia and China, as well as for Western countries trying to fight wars against an Afghan insurgency as well as wider wars on terrorism and drugs. What Kyrgyzstan tells us is that the rulers of the oil-rich Central Asian nations are in fact far less stable than they pretend. Until the Tulip Revolution, four of the five former Soviet republics that make up the region were still run by the Communist-era strongmen—who controlled an estimated 35 percent of the world's natural-gas supplies. Two remain in power, Kazakhstan's 70-year-old Nursultan Nazarbayev and Uzbekistan's 72-year-old Islam Karimov. Both have been criticized for human-rights abuses, and the likelihood is that they will crack down even harder in response to the events in Kyrgyzstan's capital, Bishkek.

Bakiyev's ouster may make the West think again about its support for corrupt and unpopular regimes in the region. "Over the last few years, the West and the EU have posited a tradeoff between stability and governance," Cooley says. But Wednesday's events in Bishkek show "that's a false trade-off." In other words, repression and corruption weaken, rather than strengthen, regimes—and when they collapse, people remember who supported the hated despot. By that token, Russia, surprisingly enough, comes off looking better than the U.S. Moscow has been strongly critical of the Bakiyev regime for at least a year, ever since Bakiyev took a $300 million tranche of Kremlin aid money that came with the categorical (if secret) proviso that the Kyrgyz must kick the U.S. out of the Manas airbase in return. Instead, Bakiyev took the Russian money, doubled down on the Americans for more rent, and, in the process, made a sworn enemy of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

"Neither Russia nor your humble servant have any links to the events in Kyrgyzstan," Putin told reporters, and he's probably telling the truth, since the limits of Russia's soft power in Kyrgyzstan were shown up by Moscow's failure to squeeze the Americans out of Manas. Still, Putin was unable to resist the temptation to twist the knife in the fallen president. "When Bakiyev came to power a few years ago he severely criticized his predecessor for nepotism—and now I have the impression that Bakiyev stepped on the same rake."

But though Russia has been the most prominent international critic of the Bakiyevs, Moscow's opportunities for leveraging that into soft and hard power are limited. U.S. rent on the Manas base, which was hiked last July from $17.1 million a year to $60 million, plus an additional $117 million for economic development, upgrading the airport, and fighting drug trafficking in the country, makes up a significant chunk of the nation's income. And it's unlikely that the incoming opposition leaders, who include former foreign minister Roza Otunbayeva and veteran activist Temir Sariyev, will take an anti-U.S. stance. Indeed the U.S. Embassy criticized the imprisonment of Sariyev and his supporters over the last year, and the U.S. government-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Kyrgyz service remains the most trusted source of news for most Kyrgyz people, despite repeated government attempts to jam it.

The immediate cause of the latest protests couldn't have been more local—a protest at a rise in electricity tariffs, imposed by national utility companies controlled by the president's family. But their message is universal. In March, Bakiyev told a national congress that democracy based on elections and individual human rights would "no longer be suitable" for Kyrgyzstan and proposed a sham "consultative democracy" instead. Ordinary Kyrgyz obviously felt that less democracy would mean more corruption and came out on the streets to protest. Hopefully, the next government will learn the lesson that Bakiyev did not—and perhaps make Kyrgyzstan the first country in Central Asia to be both democratic and stable. Washington has both idealistic and very practical reasons to help make it so.

Ending Our Imperial Foreign Policy

Ending Our Imperial Foreign Policy

As George W. Bush's term ended, he had few defenders left in the
world of foreign policy. Mainstream commentators almost unanimously agreed
the Bush years had been marked by arrogance and incompetence. "Mr. Bush's
characteristic failing was to apply a black-and-white mind-set to too many
gray areas of national security and foreign affairs," The Post
editorialized. Even Richard Perle, the neoconservative guru, acknowledged
recently that "Bush mostly failed to implement an effective foreign and
defense policy." There was hope that President Obama would abandon some of
his predecessor's rigid ideological stances.

In its first 50 days, the Obama administration has naturally been
consumed by the economic crisis, but it has nevertheless made some striking
shifts in foreign policy. Obama announced the closure of Guantanamo and the
end of any official sanction for torture. He gave his first interview as
president to an Arab network and spoke of the importance of respect when
dealing with the Muslim world -- a gesture that won him rave reviews from
normally hostile Arab journalists and politicians.

Hillary Clinton has racked up more miles in a few weeks than many of
her predecessors as secretary of state did in months, mixing symbolic
gestures of outreach with substantive talks. The administration has
signaled a willingness to start engaging with troublesome regimes such as
Syria and Iran. Clinton publicly affirmed that the United States would work
with China on the economic crisis and energy and environmental issues
despite differences on human rights. She has also offered the prospect of a
more constructive relationship with Russia.

These initial steps are all explorations in the right direction --
deserving of praise, one might think. But no, the Washington establishment
is mostly fretting, dismayed in one way or another by these moves. The
conservative backlash has been almost comical in its fury. Two weeks into
Obama's term, Charles Krauthammer lumped together a bunch of Russian
declarations and actions -- many of them long in the making -- and decided
that they were all "brazen ... provocations" that Obama had failed to
counter. Obama's "supine" diplomacy, Krauthammer thundered, was setting off
a chain of catastrophes across the globe. The Pakistani government, for
example, had obviously sensed weakness in Washington and "capitulated to
the Taliban" in the Swat Valley. Somehow Krauthammer missed the many deals
that Pakistan struck with the Taliban over the past three years -- during
Bush's reign -- deals that were more hastily put together, on worse terms,
with poorer results.

Even liberal and centrist commentators have joined in the worrying.
Leslie Gelb, the author of a smart and lively new book, "Power Rules," says
that Clinton's comments about China's human rights record were correct but
shouldn't have been made publicly. Peter Bergen of CNN says that "doing
deals with the Taliban today could further destabilize Afghanistan." Gelb
writes ruefully that it's "change for change's sake." Ah, if we just kept
in place all those Bush-era policies that were working so well.

Consider the gambit with Russia. The Washington establishment is united
in the view that Iran's nuclear program poses the greatest challenge for
the new administration. The only outside power that has any significant
leverage over Tehran is Russia, which is building its nuclear reactor and
supplying it with uranium. Exploring whether Moscow might press the
Iranians would be useful, right?

Wrong. The Post reacted by worrying that Obama might be capitulating to
Russian power. His sin was to point out in a letter to the Russian
president that if Moscow were to help in blunting the threat of missile
attacks from Tehran, the United States would not feel as pressed to
position missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic -- logical
since those defenses were meant to protect against Iranian missiles. It's
also a good trade because right now the technology for an effective missile
shield against Iran is, in the words of one expert cited by the Financial
Times's Gideon Rachman, "a system that won't work, against a threat that
doesn't exist, paid for with money that we don't have."

The problem with American foreign policy goes beyond George Bush. It
includes a Washington establishment that has gotten comfortable with the
exercise of American hegemony and treats compromise as treason and
negotiations as appeasement. Other countries can have no legitimate
interests of their own. The only way to deal with them is by issuing a
series of maximalist demands. This is not foreign policy; it's imperial
policy. And it isn't likely to work in today's world.

What Pakistan Doesn't Need From America

What Pakistan Doesn't Need From America

By Shuja Nawaz

During the tumult of 2008, the talk in Washington and in Islamabad turned to the need for the United States to have a relationship with the people of Pakistan rather than with any single leader or party. Indeed, only by garnering the support of a majority of Pakistanis can the United States leap over the yawning mistrust between these two countries and help Pakistan's government become stable.

Two months into 2009, we are waiting for that change to occur. President Obama has rightly focused attention on Pakistan, sending his powerful and highly favored representative Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to take on the difficult job of resolving regional differences and restoring stability to an embattled country. Ambassador Holbrooke will need help from both Washington and Islamabad to get to the roots of regional problems.

As our forthcoming Atlantic Council Task Force Report on Pakistan stresses, Washington needs to find a way to provide a healthy dose of financial aid to Pakistan, based on a thorough discussion and agreement with Pakistan on how that aid will be used to improve the lives of people across the country and not just in the borderland near Afghanistan. Call it conditionality or "tough love", it is important to be clear about the objectives of such aid, for the financial climate in the United States will not allow any more blank checks to be issued. On its side, Pakistan has already taken many steps to assure the international financial community that it is ready to get its economic house in order. But much more needs to be done: Improving the tax administration, broadening the tax net to capture agricultural income and capital gains, strengthening the legal system to provide cover for investors, especially from abroad, and removing corruption from the highest levels of government. Too many ministerial appointments to its cabinet (which now has 83 members) are seen by the coalition's multifarious member parties as cash cows for their party coffers.

Pakistan could also end the current "cash-for-hire" scheme under which its army was sent into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The U.S. promised to reimburse its "non-NATO ally" for the costs of making this move, and the more than $10 billion in aid given for this purpose is often used as a political stick to beat Pakistan during any discussion of aid to that country. But the U.S. reimbursement scheme barely covers the marginal costs of the army's entry into FATA, and the political costs for Pakistan have been very high, creating a huge backlash among the population of the region as well in the rest of Pakistan. Inside the Pakistan army there is simmering resentment at all levels about the manner in which the military aid and reimbursements are handled. It would in the interest of both countries to end this scheme, and for Pakistan to truly take on the war against militancy as its own war. Then, if the U.S. is serious about helping Pakistan, it would do so by meeting Pakistan's needs for financial aid and equipment (including helicopters and training). Let Pakistan do its own job, for its own sake, not because the U.S. pays it to do so.

U.S. drone attacks inside Pakistan are a source of great unhappiness inside Pakistan. The United States needs to find a practicable way of allowing Pakistan to manage the drone operations and to take the lead in identifying and attacking militant targets inside its borders. Fears about transferring sensitive technology to Pakistan could be addressed by joint operations of drones from Pakistani bases. U.S. and Pakistani handlers could "fly" the drones carrying Pakistani markings and be responsible jointly for their upkeep. If Pakistanis call the shots on final actions against foreign militants and eliminate or limit collateral civilian damage, then they will truly be fighting their own war and not "America's War."

On the regional level, Pakistan can and should play a greater role in helping Afghanistan rebuild its military institutions. Increasing collaboration between the two armies would lead to joint operations against the insurgents, while removing the mistrust that has kept Afghans and Pakistanis from working with each other. For example, Afghanistan needs to rebuild its air force something that Pakistan has experience with: it has helped launch a number of air forces in the region. It could become a partner of the United States in speeding up the re-creation of the Afghan air force. Not only would the training be faster and cheaper than with US help alone but also the longer-term effects of close cooperation could lead to mutually understood practices and combined operations. Over time even Indian involvement in this effort could become feasible; both India and Pakistan once assisted Sri Lanka, during the early days of its insurgency.

While the Obama administration seeks to re-energize the engagement with Afghanistan and Pakistan, it will need to find new ways of making friends and helping reduce regional animosities. Throwing money at problems is one way. Changing peoples' minds about each other may be a better way of achieving peace and stability in that region.

Pakistan's Biggest Threat Isn't Foreign

Ask 10 Pakistanis what the cause of their country's security breakdown is, and you are likely to hear at least 10 answers. One of the most widespread beliefs is that Pakistan's problems, much like those of neighboring Afghanistan, were caused by foreign entities - or, more specifically, foreign meddling in domestic affairs.

Regardless of how bad the situation may appear, many I've spoken with here in Pakistan are skeptical that any foreign players know how to solve Pakistan's domestic problems. But after what I've seen here, I disagree.

Pakistan is in dire need of the proper financing to get it back on its feet and help it address the economic and social problems that might be causing its downfall. However, if the United States has a genuine desire to see a stable Pakistan, then President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton must distance themselves from the shortsighted policies of the Bush administration, whether that be military assistance or occasional drone attacks. Recovery can only come in the form of hefty economic development and an overhaul of Pakistan's outdated infrastructure. We saw one positive step in this direction this week: the trade and transit agreement signed by Pakistan and Afghan leaders in Washington on Wednesday aimed at increasing commerce and foreign investment.

In recent months, a financial boost from governments including the U.S., Japan and Saudi Arabia has further emphasized the idea that the key to curbing violence in Pakistan is economic and social development. Pakistan, which recently signed a loan package with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for $7.6 billion, has experienced a significant economic decline in recent years as its inflation rate climbed to 25 percent and its stocks plummeted, falling an average 35 percent last year. All major rating agencies have downgraded Pakistan and the recent surge in terrorist-related attacks has caused most new investments to dry up. What's worse, economists in Pakistan are predicting significant job losses over the next two years of anywhere from 3 to 4 million people, further exacerbating the crisis faced by Pakistan's poor and struggling middle class.

Further exacerbating Pakistan's instability is the growing number of displaced persons in the country. Currently more than 1.7 million Afghan refugees live in Pakistan. 45 percent of those reside in refugee villages and the rest are scattered among host communities, according to UNHCR. However, recent violence in the Swat Valley and neighboring Buner and Dir has forced hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis to flee, leaving the overburdened Pakistani government scrambling for solutions.

Many of the citizens here are scared. Even in Lahore, which is considered relatively safe, a series of recent attacks have left many on edge. Many dual passport holders are now opting to leave for lack of a better option. Many here have little confidence in their government's ability to cap this growing threat.

Those countries willing to support Pakistan through financial assistance have a responsibility to ensure that the money is properly allocated. Better roads and bridges, more job opportunities through business development, and further development of the country's energy sector could provide hope to an increasingly disenfranchised population and move this country forward.

Cooperation is a two-way street. In return, Pakistan must be more transparent with donors as the security situation worsens. Pakistani forces have been spread thin by military operations in the Swat Valley and neighboring districts. The Taliban will continue to advance across the country's North West Frontier Province. The Pakistani government must not allow pride to get the best of it. The country has long been fearful that any foreign intervention could compromise its nuclear program - but domestic entities pose a threat that is far more grim. The time to act is now
prof Mohammad Ashfaq

US Foreign Policy in year 2009

2009 Lowlights and Highlights in US Foreign Policy

From Barry Kolodkin, former About.com Guide

Afghan Army Soldiers in Helmand Province

John Moore/Getty Images

The end of the year provides opportunity for review of the year's events. We take the opportunity to offer our view of the Top 5 Lowlights and Highlights of the year 2009 in US foreign policy.

Lowlights

1. Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan¹ has been going on eight years; longer than Vietnam or either of the World Wars. The US has been losing ground to the Taliban and has stretched into Pakistan. US hopes for an increasingly unpopular war now rely on a military surge which helped stabilize the Iraqi situation but did little to bring the US closer to victory.

2. Iran. The Iranian nuclear weapons program² is still going strong. President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad is still in power and "busting heads" of protesters. America has not succeeded to change Iranian policy³ through sanctions or through engagement and friendlier rhetoric. Hopes for change in Iran lie with the brave people in green who stand for protest for freedom and democracy.

3. Africa. President Bill Clinton said his biggest regret was not doing more to stop the 1990s genocide in Rwanda⁴. In 2009, Africa is stricken with genocide in Darfur, the atrocities of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, pirates in Somalia, the UN battling rebels in the Congo and placing sanctions on Eritrea and widespread urban crime and violence. Fifteen years after the Rwandan genocide, the West still really does not care about Africa. At least not very much.

4. Iraq. The good news: Iraq⁵ is a far less violent place than it was five years ago and US troops are being sent home. The bad news: There are still plenty of IEDs⁶ and anti-American sentiments. Plus, the Iraqi government is susceptible to Iranian influence.

5. Guantanamo. The delay in shutting down the prison in Guantanamo⁷ is reminiscent of Congress not wanting to seem weak on terrorism during the vote on the invasion of Iraq. American prisons want Guantanamo's prisoners. Highly trained and valuable US soldiers are being utilized as prison guards for people who should be executed, set free or receive justice in the land where they committed their atrocities.

Honorable Mention

-- Latin America. Kidnappings in Phoenix, executions in Juarez, Chavez stirring the pot in Venezuela, support for Zelaya in Honduras and slow progress with Cuba make Latin America⁸ a weak spot in foreign policy in 2009.

-- China. The US and China are not adversaries⁹. However, the two countries are far from friends, which seems strange considering the tremendous economic linkages, the number of Chinese studying and living in America and common geopolitical interests such as curbing international terrorism and extremism.

Highlights

1. Restoring hope and faith in the US. The Obama Administration¹⁰, regardless of the relative merits of the Nobel Peace Prize¹¹, has brought hope to the rest of the world that the US will bring moral and steady leadership in the 21st century¹².

2. Russia. Secretary Clinton¹³ hoped to reset the relationship with Russia¹⁴. While the US-Russian relationship is not as friendly as the Clinton-Yeltsin years, the palpable acrimony during the later years of the Putin regime is no longer apparent, and Presidents Obama and Medvedev appear to be making headway on arms control negotiations.

3. Middle East peace. Is the world close to a lasting peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians¹⁵? Not at all. Nonetheless, the fact that Israel's Likud government led by Benjamin Netanyahu¹⁶ has re-engaged, publicly stated acceptance of some form of a two-state solution and agreed to freeze the majority of settlements is no small feat. Obama and Clinton deserve credit for their renewed effort and results, albeit somewhat limited results.

4. Response to the economic crisis. 2009 saw the US provide leadership to try to stimulate the global economy¹⁷ and add financial regulation. While the worldwide economic growth is still sluggish, most economists believe the worst is over.

5. NATO. The decision to delay NATO expansion¹⁸ to Georgia and Ukraine was a smart one, as was the decision to accept Albania and Croatia. In addition, the US has managed to garner some additional international support for the surge in Afghanistan.

Honorable Mention

-- Old Europe. Two years ago, the US was criticized for forsaking Old or Western Europe in favor of New¹⁹ or Eastern Europe. This is no longer the case.

Prof Mohammad Ashfaq Government Sadiq Egerton College Bahawalpur Pakistan